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Abstract
This paper looks at the variables that determine the location of hydraulic fracturing 
wells.  Using cross-sectional data on Texas counties, we test whether county 
income level and the percentage of the population that is minority are significant 
indicators of well location.  This study mirrors other studies that focus on the 
location of undesirable land uses such as landfills.  Our study finds that income 
level and the size of the minority population are not statistically significant 
indicators of hydraulic fracturing well location.
I. Introduction
The method of hydraulic fracturing used in the oil and gas industry has 
been utilized for many years.  More recently in the natural gas industry, the method 
of hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, has been combined with 
horizontal drilling in order to access more gas from each well.  The well not only 
extends vertically into the deep shale basins, but also horizontally from the kickoff 
point up to 10,500 feet outwards (Hydraulic Fracturing). This new technique as 
well as the discovery of Marcellus shale along the east coast has brought fracking 
to the attention of the public at large.  The potential environmental and health 
impacts of fracking wells on the surrounding area will be discussed later in the 
paper and are widely debated.  The question of interest for this paper, however, is 
how great is the impact of local income levels and other demographic measures 
as indicators of where natural gas wells are located.
The question this paper focuses on is interesting because it investigates 
one example of externalities resulting from natural resource extraction.  The 
difficulty of these externalities is balancing the need for the service with the 
unaccounted for cost of accessing it.  To explore this a bit further, consider that 
natural gas could be the solution to the United States’ dependence on foreign oil 
because the country has many large shale deposits, the rock formation that holds 
6the natural gas.  Natural gas would also boost the economy as a new area of 
development.  It burns cleaner than other widely used fossil fuels so it could help 
solve problems with greenhouse gas emissions.  The downside of this venture 
is the externalities that come from drilling natural gas wells.  Research is just 
beginning to emerge on the health impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells for people 
and the environment.  This makes it difficult to form a strong argument for the 
existence of this particular negative externality.  Instead, this paper will simply 
look at where these wells are being located.
The initial motivation for this paper is the current debate on Marcellus 
shale.  Watching the documentary Gasland serves as further inspiration because 
the families that seem to be dealing with the problems associated with natural 
gas wells appear to have lower incomes.  The idea for the model used in this 
paper is inspired by the models set up by Boer et al. and Pastor et al.  These 
two articles investigate the claims of environmental racism with regard to the 
location of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDF).  The research in 
this paper applies a similar model to the location of natural gas wells, which will 
be discussed further in the literature review section.  Texas counties are the focus 
of this analysis because data is most easily accessible for this area on all of the 
variables included in the model.
Assuming that there is some negative externality from natural gas wells, 
whether it is the loss in land aesthetics or water contamination, our interest is in 
the equality of the distribution of this externality.  Economists are interested in the 
location of sites that result in some negative externality, such as hazardous waste 
facilities and landfills, to see whether they are disproportionately located near a 
certain portion of the population.  This new area of interest has culminated as the 
environmental justice movement.  Environmental justice “is the principle that all 
people and communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and 
7public health laws and regulations” (Brulle 2006).  Is there environmental justice 
in the location of natural gas wells?  Similar questions have been asked by other 
researchers but we have not found another paper on the application to the natural 
gas industry.  
There are three economic theories that have been developed that 
pertain to the issues highlighted by the environmental justice movement: 
discrimination, the Coase theorem, and the theory of collective action (Hamilton 
1993).  Discrimination and the theory of collective action are the main points 
made by researchers in support of the environmental justice movement.  The 
results of Hamilton’s study indicate “that firms processing hazardous waste, when 
deciding where to expand capacity, do take into account variations in the potential 
for collective action to raise their costs” (Hamilton 1993).  This is just one 
specific, illustrative example of the theory of collective action.  Discrimination 
is very similar to this but references specific demographic characteristics as the 
distinguishing factor in firms’ decision-making with respect to the location of 
undesirable land uses.  
The Coase theorem alternatively states that “even in the presence of 
externalities an economy can always reach an efficient solution provided that the 
costs of making a deal are sufficiently low” (Krugman et al. 2007).  Applying this 
to the location of fracking wells, a well should be located where the benefit from 
the wells exceeds the costs.  One can argue this theory does not hold true because 
the health impact of the drilling exceeds the benefits to the economy.  This is 
an especially poignant argument today with the recent statement released by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The EPA stated, in response to water 
contamination complaints from the community of Pavillion, Wyoming, that “the 
explanation best fitting the data…is that constituents associated with hydraulic 
fracturing have been released into the Wind River drinking water aquifer” (Llanos 
82011).  In the past, EPA studies have supported the findings of the natural gas 
companies that fracking does not cause water contamination.  New findings may 
change the current leniency the natural gas industry benefits from.
Before we discuss the empirical analysis behind the paper further, it 
is first important to understand some of the politics behind the controversy of 
hydraulic fracturing wells.  The main point that will be addressed here is the 
exemptions from federal regulations that the natural gas industry has accumulated. 
The most notable exemptions are from the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts as 
of 1990 and 1987 respectively (New York Times).  In 2005, Congress exempted 
natural gas drillers from having to provide detailed reports on the potential 
environmental impact of some of their activities, thus exempting them from the 
National Environmental Policy Act (New York Times).  Again in 2005, after an 
EPA study was challenged by one of its own members saying that the study’s 
conclusions were unsupported and that some members of the study’s peer review 
panel had conflicts of interest, Congress still exempted hydraulic fracturing from 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (New York Times).  Other exemptions for hydraulic 
fracturing include from the Superfund Act in 1980, the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right to Know Act in 1986, and exemption from the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1988 (New York Times).  This relatively large 
list of government approved exemptions from regulations that ultimately protect 
Americans’ health adds to our interest in the environmental justice claims that will 
be investigated in this paper.
II. Literature Review
Our interest in the topic was partially inspired by such articles as “The 
Gas Dilemma,” written by Bryan Walsh of Time Magazine that begins by noting 
that the great energy potential of natural gas comes with “the catch” that it could 
come with significant environmental and social costs.  The environmental justice 
9movement is interested in such situations as the equal distribution of these costs 
across society.  The movement has in recent times been gaining attention from 
more and more academic literature.  The goal of much of this literature is to 
determine whether or not demographic inequalities characterize the location of 
sites that pose some risk to the surrounding population.  Boer et al. considers 
the location of TSDF.  Other authors have studied the location of other “locally 
undesirable land uses” such as landfills (Been 1993).  One of these land uses 
that has not be researched in depth is the location of hydraulic fracturing wells. 
This paper adapts the methods used by other researchers on environmental justice 
issues to see if the locations of these wells are characterized by demographic 
inequalities.
The known impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells are habitat fragmentation 
and the risk of a fluid spill.  Hazardous chemicals are used in fracking to break 
the shale.  When the fluids come back up, they are moved to a membrane-lined 
storage pad to dry out so the water from the mixture can evaporate.  If the pad 
tears or there are heavy rains during this process, these pads can develop leaks or 
overflow.  A controversial hazard of fracking wells is the potential contamination 
of groundwater and more specifically residential wells.  This would be caused 
by the release of Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM).  When the 
shale is broken, NORMs can leak up through the ground along with some of 
the fracking fluids.  With these risks in mind, we continue our review of related 
studies to see how their methods can be applied to this new land use.
The econometric model used in this paper utilizes variables relevant 
to this study from previous literature that also evaluates environmental justice 
claims.  In many of the other studies there are measures of the presence of an 
undesirable land use such as TSDF.  This study uses a measure of the number of 
wells in a county as the dependent variable (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997). 
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In similar studies there are usually independent variables that account for logical 
reasons for the location of such a facility such as community waste generation 
or the cost of locating in an area (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997).  The study 
presented in this paper similarly uses average land value to account for the cost of 
locating a well in a specific area.
In the study done by Boer et al., the authors found both median household 
income and per capita income to have statistically significant coefficients so this 
study uses median household income because it is less influenced by outliers 
(Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997).  The final major influence you will see in this 
paper from previous literature is the use of simultaneous equations.  The use of 
this type of model is consistent with the article written by Pastor et al., which 
investigates the disproportionate siting and minority move-in hypotheses.  This 
brief overview justifies the modeling techniques used here because it shows that 
while this study explores a different issues, its structure is based on previously 
peer-reviewed work.
III. Modeling
The basis of the model in this paper is the question of whether or not 
local income levels and other demographics can indicate to a certain extent 
where natural gas wells are located.  There is evidence both for and against 
the hypothesis that these factors do impact well location.  One specific claim 
related to the environmental justice argument is that firms consider the potential 
for communities to mobilize and engage in collective action in deciding where 
to locate locally undesirable land uses (Hamilton 1993).  Hamilton finds that 
commercial hazardous waste firms did take this factor into account in deciding 
where to add capacity during the period 1987-1992.  His explanation of this result 
is that “the differing degree to which groups organize to demand compensation 
and raise a firm’s costs of choosing a particular location drives a wedge between 
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the social costs of its externalities and the costs voiced through the political 
process of its site selection” and therefore challenges the outcome of the Coase 
theorem (Hamilton 1993).  The location where the potential for collective action 
is the least may not be where the damage of its externalities is the least (Hamilton 
1993).  This is just one piece of evidence from past research that suggests that 
demographic characteristics that stereotypically suggest less potential for 
collective action significantly impact the location of facilities that bring with it 
negative externalities born by the surrounding community.
Other potential evidence that would support our hypothesis would be 
if the coefficients on the income and/or the minority population variables are 
statistically significant in difference from 0 given our data on fracking wells 
and demographics of counties in Texas.  Contradicting evidence would be if the 
coefficients on the previous variables were not statistically significant yet the 
coefficients on the control variables were.  To test to see what evidence can be 
gathered from this analysis we first used the following model:
The hypothesis is that the income and minority population variables do significantly 
impact the number of wells within a county.  These two variables are the focus of 
this research.  The control variables include a proxy variable for the presence of 
natural gas (Resource), population size (Population), and the land area of a county 
(Land).  Hamilton’s paper illustrates the reason why the theory holds that these 
two variables may be significant, because stereotypically both low income and 
minority communities are seen as having less collective action potential against 
such issues as fracking well location.  Resource accounts for the fact that firms 
will build wells where there is natural gas to extract.  Population and Land are 
included because they are control variables included in other comparable models 
and they account for the fact that the less land there is open, the fewer wells that 
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can be built due to the space required for the construction.  According to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, each natural 
gas well site requires between 3 to 5 acres when fully constructed.
 The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is first used to estimate the 
coefficients of the multivariable regression but the initial model is not correctly 
specified.  We find that our initial model has simultaneity bias and correct for this 
by using the two-stage lease squares (2SLS) method.  Additional variables are 
included after further research.  The final model we work with is a simultaneous 
equations model where Wells and Income are endogenous variables and Resource, 
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, and Education are exogenous variables.  The 
simultaneous equations that will be estimated are as follows:
Opponents to environmental justice claims argue that firms’ do not choose to 
locate an undesirable land use in low income communities.  They argue that the 
location of the site is due to the cost of land because land costs are usually lower 
in low income communities or that low income households often relocate near 
these sites because land costs decrease.  We do not have panel data to account for 
simultaneous changes in number of wells and land value.  Instead, we use county 
income level as the instrumental variable.  This study therefore cannot imply 
anything about the firms’ or the communities’ decision making.  It is assumed 
that county demographics before the more widespread construction of natural 
gas wells are determined by the exogenous variable for 1997 land value.  It is 
also assumed that this land value is equivalent to the price natural gas companies 
would have to pay in order to locate a well there.  Given these two assumptions, 
we can then account for the significance of demographic characteristics and the 
included control variables on the number of wells in a county.  The hypothesis 
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is that county income levels do have a significant impact on the number of 
wells located in the county, holding constant the impact of all other explanatory 
variables.  This hypothesis would support environmental justice claims.  We 
continue with a more in depth description of the data used in this analysis before 
examining the regression results.
IV. Data
 The ideal data set would be a panel data set including data on all counties 
in the United States for a number of time periods.  The data would include 
measures of the number of wells built during each time period, the amount of 
accessible shale within each county, population density, the average value of 
land, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the 
county population that is minority, and the median income of each county for each 
specified time period.  Acquiring this data would allow the study to better analyze 
the firms’ decisions on locating natural gas wells.  By lagging some variables such 
as income, the number of wells built in the next time period would presumably 
reflect data the decision maker would have from the previous period.  With this 
data, the impact of demographics such as income level and minority could be 
better isolated from the impact of land value on firms’ decision-making.  Due to 
time restrictions and data availability, cross-sectional data is used over all counties 
in Texas, a state with a large presence of the natural gas industry.
 A sample of all Texas counties that had appropriate data was included in 
this model.  This sample of 233 counties only excluded 21 counties due to missing 
data.  The variables included in the final regression model are Wells, Resource, 
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, Income, and Education.  Table 1 includes 
descriptions of these variables and lists their sources and Figure 1 provides the 
basic statistics on each variable.
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Table 1
Figure1
Note that Wells, Income, and Resource have the largest standard deviations 
suggesting that these variables vary most about their mean relative to other 
included variables.  Our empirical analysis may find that the variation in Wells is 
best explained by the variation of Income and/or Resource.  These observations 
are purely speculative.
V. Evidence
 As mentioned before, the analysis began with a multiple regression 
model that was estimated using OLS.  This model was first estimated using a 
random sample of 30 counties in Texas.  After the data on all counties in Texas 
were collected, the regression model was run again with the same specification. 
Using the Ramsey RESET test, we found that the old model specification no 
longer fit the data.  With both regressions there were heteroscedasticity problems, 
   e duc a t i on         233    16 . 49313    6 . 356069        6 . 6        43 . 1
   v a l ue 1997         233    644. 1245    716. 5479         30        5899
                                                                      
  popde ns i t y          234    103. 5985    309. 8335         . 1        2718
    mi nor i t y          234    40 . 49573    21 . 43345          6          97
      i nc ome          234    41162. 29    9592. 201      21841      80548
    r e s our c e          234    2 . 85e +07    7 . 30e +07          0    6 . 49e +08
       we l l s          234    432. 8162    927. 3171          0        6003
                                                                      
    Va r i a bl e          Obs         Me a n    S t d.  De v .        Mi n        Ma x
.  s umma r i z e  we l l s  r e s our c e  i nc ome  mi nor i t y  popde ns i t y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on
Variable
Wells
Resource
PopDensity
Minority
Value1997
Income
Education
 
Description
Number of regular producing gas wells as of 
September 2010
Gas wells gas production in thousands of cubic 
feet; measured from January to December 2010
Persons per square mile, 2010
2010 minority population as percentage of total 
population
1997 average county market value of acre of land
2009 Median household income
2005-2009 percentage of population age 25+ with 
bachelor’s degree or higher
Source
Railroad Commission 
of Texas
Railroad Commission 
of Texas
US Census Bureau
US Census Bureau
Texas A&M Institute 
of Renewable Natural 
Resources
US Census Bureau
US Census Bureau
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which were corrected for by using robust standard errors.  The results of these 
initial regressions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Variables N=30P-values
N=30
Coefficients
N=233
P-values
N=233
Coefficients
Resource 0.03 6.49*10-6 0.00 8.64*10-6
Population 0.27 -0.0026 0.07 -0.00039
Minority 0.06 2772.626 0.06 568.54
Income 0.12 0.0758 0.04 0.015
Land 0.28 0.2511 0.11 0.025
After attempting logical model specification changes using OLS regression 
methods, the model was tested for simultaneity bias using the Hausman 
Specification Test.  In this process, we decided to include slightly different 
variables reflecting further research.  The test results, shown in Figure 2, indicate 
that the model does have simultaneity bias because the Prob>F value (0.01) is less 
than 0.05.  In other words, the impact of the residuals from running a regression 
of the reduced form equations is significant in difference from 0.  This also means 
that there is a feedback loop so to correct for this we construct the simultaneous 
equations discussed above and estimate them using 2SLS.  The regression results 
are shown in Figure 3.  Before interpreting the regression results, it is also 
important to note that the 2SLS model was also tested to see if Income was a 
strong instrumental variable.  The Stata output from this test is shown in Figure 4. 
The OLS regression of the instrumental variable Income on all included variables 
and the identifying variable, Education, indicates that Income is a good instrument 
because the Prob>F value (0.00) is less than the 0.05 level of significance so we 
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can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all included variables are 0. 
In other words, the Adjusted-R2 is statistically significant in difference from 0.
Figure 2
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Figure 3
                                                                              
I ns t r ume nt s :    r e s our c e  popde ns i t y  mi nor i t y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on
I ns t r ume nt e d:   i nc ome
                                                                              
       _ c ons      1916. 833     1743. 2      1 . 10    0 . 273    - 1518. 088    5351. 755
   v a l ue 1997     . 4811013   . 1198733     4 . 01    0 . 000     . 2448946    . 7173079
    mi nor i t y     - 3 . 345217   6 . 346545    - 0 . 53    0 . 599    - 15 . 85089    9 . 160455
  popde ns i t y     - . 7137522   . 3390545    - 2 . 11    0 . 036    - 1 . 381849   - . 0456557
    r e s our c e      9 . 79e - 06   9 . 12e - 07    10 . 73    0 . 000     7 . 99e - 06    . 0000116
      i nc ome     - . 0451702    . 038675    - 1 . 17    0 . 244    - . 1213782    . 0310378
                                                                              
       we l l s         Coe f .    S t d.  E r r .       t     P>| t |      [ 95% Conf .  I nt e r v a l ]
                                                                              
       T ot a l      200223326   232  863031. 578           Root  MS E       =  798. 98
                                                       Adj  R- s qua r e d =  0 . 2603
    Re s i dua l      144908993   227  638365. 607           R- s qua r e d     =  0 . 2763
       Mode l     55314333. 4      5   11062866. 7            Pr ob > F       =  0 . 0000
                                                       F (   5 ,    227)  =   34 . 84
      S our c e          S S        df        MS               Numbe r  of  obs  =     233
I ns t r ume nt a l  v a r i a bl e s  ( 2S L S )  r e gr e s s i on
> y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on)
.  i v r e g we l l s  r e s our c e  popde ns i t y  mi nor i t y  v a l ue 1997 ( i nc ome = popde ns i t y  mi nor i t
Figure 4
                                                                              
       _ c ons       41294. 8    1974. 299    20 . 92    0 . 000      37404. 5     45185. 09
   e duc a t i on     244. 3049   99 . 78071     2 . 45    0 . 015      47 . 6901    440. 9198
   v a l ue 1997     . 9108222   1 . 068944     0 . 85    0 . 395    - 1 . 195499    3 . 017144
    mi nor i t y     - 142. 6194   26 . 65511    - 5 . 35    0 . 000    - 195. 1425   - 90 . 09638
  popde ns i t y      6 . 732463   2 . 319925     2 . 90    0 . 004     2 . 161121    11 . 30381
    r e s our c e      . 0000132   7 . 85e - 06     1 . 68    0 . 095    - 2 . 30e - 06    . 0000286
                                                                              
      i nc ome         Coe f .    S t d.  E r r .       t     P>| t |      [ 95% Conf .  I nt e r v a l ]
                                                                              
       T ot a l     2 . 1063e +10   232  90790902. 5            Root  MS E       =  8437. 6
                                                       Adj  R- s qua r e d =  0 . 2159
    Re s i dua l     1 . 6161e +10   227  71192896. 9            R- s qua r e d     =  0 . 2328
       Mode l     4 . 9027e +09     5    980540354           Pr ob > F       =  0 . 0000
                                                       F (   5 ,    227)  =   13 . 77
      S our c e          S S        df        MS               Numbe r  of  obs  =     233
.  r e gr e s s  i nc ome  r e s our c e  popde ns i t y  mi nor i t y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on
 The p-values for Resource (0.00), PopDensity (0.04), and Value1997 
(0.00) indicate that we can reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients on 
these variables are 0.  In other words, their coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant in difference from 0.  The coefficients on these variables do all have the 
expected sign.  The coefficient on Resource is positive, which is logical because if 
there is more natural gas in a county, there should be more wells to extract it.  The 
coefficients on PopDensity and Value1997 are not as expected.  This possibly can 
be explained by an unaccounted for model specification problem.
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Previous literature has found that there is a parabolic relationship 
between the presence of an undesirable land use site and income.  Boer et al. 
found that “income has first a positive, then a negative effect on TSDF location, 
a pattern that likely reflects the fact that the poorest communities have little 
economic activity while wealthier communities have the economic and political 
power to resist negative environmental externalities.”  This finding may also 
apply to PopDensity and Value1997.  Very desolate areas where land is not 
habitable may correspond with a type of land where shale deposits are also not 
often found while very populated areas, where water and organic materials are 
more abundant, are too populated for the construction of a natural gas well.  This 
example, purely speculative, describes a similar situation to that found by Boer 
et al.  A step for further research would be to include a squared term.  A similar 
example could be constructed for Value1997.  This relationship is not accounted 
for by the current model and could explain the unexpected sign of the coefficients. 
The final observation from this regression analysis that is pertinent to our study 
is that the sign of the coefficient on Income, although not significant in difference 
from 0, has the hypothesized sign.  The coefficient is negative suggesting that 
if income increases, the number of wells in that county will decrease, holding 
constant the impact of all other variables.  The coefficient on Minority is also 
negative, contrary to our hypothesis.  The weaknesses of this study are the lack of 
panel data and the model specification.  Further research is needed on this issue 
to gain better insight into the location of these wells as the natural gas industry 
continues to grow.
VI. Conclusions
 Although the model does not indicant that the impacts of income and 
minority status on the number of wells in a county are significant, further research 
is necessary to look at this relationship across time.  We believe that analysis using 
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panel data may find different results or at least offer a more clear interpretation 
and application of findings.  This study suggests that income and the percentage 
of the population that is a minority are not significant indicators of where natural 
gas wells are located in Texas counties.  These findings challenge claims made by 
the environmental justice movement.  This does not mean, however, that there is 
any less of a need to do further research on the possible health and environmental 
impacts of hydraulic fracturing.  Further analytical research is needed in on the 
issue of fracking well location that can address the issues of the best unit of 
observation (county, census tract, borough, etc) that should be used in the analysis 
and data limitations.  Research is crucial for appropriate policy implementation 
and public understanding especially as the natural gas industry expands.
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